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THE PRAGMATIC FACE OF THE COVERT IDEALIST: THE ROLE OF 
ALLEN DULLES IN US POLICY DISCUSSIONS ON LATIN AMERICA, 
1953-611 
 
$VVHVVPHQWV RI WKH &,$¶V UROH LQ /DWLQ $PHULFD GXULQJ WKH V KDYH
tended to focus predominantly on the twin case-studies of Guatemala and 
&XED&RQVHTXHQWO\ WKH $JHQF\¶V UROH ± and, more broadly, that of its 
head Allen Dulles ± has come to be seen as one obsessed with covert 
action and relatively unimportant in terms of policy discussions. Dulles, 
in fact, has been portrayed as an unwilling and disinterested participant 
in policy discussions. The present article will challenge those assertions 
E\ VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW E\ H[DPLQLQJ 'XOOHV¶V UROH LQ WKH (LVHQKRZHU
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V GLVFXVVLRQV RQ /DWLQ $PHULFD a different picture 
emerges ± one that paints Dulles as an active and rational participant, 
DQGZKLFKUDLVHVLPSRUWDQWTXHVWLRQVIRURXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH&,$¶V
role during the Eisenhower era. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
µ,QWKHV¶ZULWHV*UHJ*UDQGLQLQGHVFULELQJWKH&HQWUDO ,QWHOOLJHQFH$JHQF\¶V role in 
*XDWHPDODLQµWKH&ROG:DUZDs often presented as a battle of ideas, yet CIA agents on 
WKHJURXQGGLGQ¶WVHHLWWKDWZD\¶«WKH\LQVLVWHGµRQDVWUDWHJ\LQWHQGHGWRLQVSLUHIHDUPRUH
WKDQ YLUWXH¶2 *UDQGLQ¶V YLHZ ± along with the widely held perception among many non-
specialists that thH V VHUYHG DV D IRUP RI µJROGHQ DJH¶ IRU WKH &,$ ± has come to 
GRPLQDWH KLVWRULFDO DQG LQGHHG FXOWXUDO UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV RI WKH $JHQF\¶V UROH LQ WKH HDUO\-
Cold War era. During the period when Dwight D. Eisenhower was president and Allen Dulles 
was the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), it is commonly held, the CIA enjoyed a 
position of unparalleled success in US foreign policy. 2EYLRXVO\WKLVKDVEHHQDµJROGHQDJH¶
with significant caveats: while the Agency may have enjoyed significant prominence in the 
implementation of US policy in this era, it is not seen as being a key player in terms of policy 
making. Its record of operations, meanwhile, has been strongly criticised by scholars 
concerned at the way that the Cold War served to legitimise operations that had disastrous 
consequences in human terms.3  
 
 Nonetheless, UHYHODWLRQVDERXW WKH&,$¶VDFWLYLWLHV LQ WKLVSHULRG ± particularly with 
respect to the Third World, where CIA interventions were most flagrant and most damaging ± 
have only served to strengthen this perception of Agency influence :LWK (LVHQKRZHU¶V
proclivity toward psychological warfare and covert operations increasingly to the fore, the 
CIA was an essential part of his armoury in the ongoing struggle against the Soviet Union.4 
Predictably, Allen Dulles has become synonymous with this period: the DCI who pursued the 
$JHQF\¶VLQWHUHVWVRYHUVDZLWVLQWHUYHQWLRQVDQGGLGKLVSUHVLGHQW¶VELGGLQJ6KRUWO\DIWHUKLV
death in 1969, for example, Time demonstrated the enduring power of the Allen Dulles-CIA 
OLQNµ$WWKHDXVWHUH&,$KHDGTXDUWHUV¶DW/DQJOH\± constructed almost as monument to the 
Dulles era ± µa bas-UHOLHI SODTXH ZLWK $OOHQ 'XOOHV
 OLNHQHVV EHDUV WKH LQVFULSWLRQ ³+LV
Monument Is Around UV´¶5 To be sure, this has often been to his detriment. Allen Dulles 
may have been a key protagonist in building the Cold War CIA, but his tenure also oversaw a 
series of disastrous and illegal LQWHUYHQWLRQV 'XOOHV¶V $JHQF\ EURNH LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ
subverted democratically elected governments and supported brutal dictatorships as long as 
they were pro-American ± all under a banner of legitimisation provided by the Cold War.  
 
This legacy has been especially prevalent in the Americas. As a test of this, it is worth 
considering what comes to mind ZKHQPHQWLRQLQJWKHSKUDVHWKHµ&,$LQ/DWLQ$PHULFDLQ
WKHV¶)RUPRVWRIXVLWLVLQHYLWDEO\WZRFDVHVWXGLHV*XDWHPDODDQG&XED7KH&,$¶V
role in planning for covert operations in these two nations ± RQHD³VXFFHVV´LQ*XDWHPDODLQ
1954, the other a precursor to a disaster in Cuba in 1961 ± have come to be seen as the 
predominant examples RI WKH $JHQF\¶V UROH LQ (LVHQKRZHU¶V /DWLQ $PHULFDQ SROLF\ In 
historiographical terms, this has had two major outcomes. First, it has contributed 
significantly to the predominant school of thought regarding Allen Dulles ± which paints him 
as an excitable and adventurous advocate and planner of covert operations, but as a 
disinterested and unwilling participant in wider policy discussions.6 Second, it has helped to 
confirm the view that the &,$¶VUROHLQLQWHU-American affairs at this time was primarily as an 
operational and intelligence gathering body. (6WXGLHVRI(LVHQKRZHU¶V/DWLQ$PHrican policy, 
it bears noting, do not often mention the CIA apart from its involvement in Guatemala and 
Cuba).7 Consequently, Dulles has become rarely featured in examinations of US policy 
discussions on Latin America. 
 
By contrast, the present article will argue that, when it came to policy discussions 
over Latin America, Allen Dulles was far from the disinterested and unwilling participant he 
is often portrayed as. Rather, he was a well-informed and pragmatic advisor who challenged 
the assertions of other administration officials, notably his brother, secretary of state John 
Foster Dulles, and vice president Richard Nixon, and who refused to adopt simplistic or 
reflexive notions of blaming communists for every problem encountered in the region. This is 
not to suggest that Dulles was soft on communism and the Soviet Union, that he did not have 
his own motives in mind, or an attempt to revise past critical judgements. After all, he could 
EH DV VWULGHQW DQG DV IRUWKULJKW RQ VXFK WRSLFV DV DQ\ RI (LVHQKRZHU¶V DGYLVRUV, while his 
failings and foibles have been well documented and accurately depicted. Instead, it is to 
FRQWHQG WKDW'XOOHV¶VDSSURDFK LQ LQWHUQDOSROLF\GLVFXVVLRQVZDVoften based on pragmatic 
assessments of the available data. And while he would often stop short of outright policy 
suggestions ± believing these to be outside the remit of his role ± he would frequently seek to 
ensure that decisions were taken that would stand up to scrutiny. Of course, some of this was 
WR HQVXUH WKDW WKH $JHQF\¶V UHSXWDWLRQ UHPDLQHG LQWDFW 'XOOHV Zas determined that the 
Agency was successful, and that its clinical achievements in operational affairs were matched 
by reliability and rationality in terms of intelligence. But the fact that this facet to his 
personality remained constant WKURXJKRXW (LVHQKRZHU¶V SUHVLGHQF\ DOVR VXJJHVWV D FOHDU
modus operandi that is clearly at odds with the way he was portrayed, both at the time and in 
later examinations.  
 
In practical terms, then, $OOHQ'XOOHVZDVRQHRI(LVHQKRZHU¶VPRVWrational advisors 
on Latin American political affairs. Interestingly, this rarely brought about a dramatic change 
in approach or policy; yet it does provide a new angle on the role played by Dulles ± and, 
more broadly, the CIA ± LQWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VGLVFXVVLRQVWRZDUGWKHUHJLRQ:KHWKHUWKLV
reappraisal is one that repeats itself with regard to other areas of the world, however, remains 
to be seen. Nevertheless, 'XOOHV¶V FRQWLQXDOO\ SUDJPDWLF FRQWULEXWLRQV WR DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ
discussions over Latin America QHHGWREHFRQVLGHUHGLQLVRODWLRQIURPWKH$JHQF\¶VEURDGHU
reputation ± fLUVWO\ WRXQGHUVWDQG$OOHQ'XOOHV¶V UROHPRUH IXOO\ DQGVHFRQGO\ WREURDGHQ
RXUFRQFHSWLRQRIWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VSROLF\-making dynamic in certain areas. 
 
DULLES AND INTELLIGENCE 
 
Dulles himself has provoked some of the prevailing historical conclusions that have 
characterised his role. In The Craft of Intelligence Dulles often refers to the National Security 
Act of 1947 as being the blueprint for the role of the CIA and the DCI.8 The act is clear about 
the way that intelligence information should be prHVHQWHG µ7KH 'LUHFWRU RI 1DWLRQDO
Intelligence,¶ VKRXOGSURYLGH LQWHOOLJHQFH WKDW LV µWLPHO\REMHFWLYH LQGHSHQGHQWRISROLWLFDO
considerations, and based upon all sources available to the intelligence community.¶9 While 
'XOOHV¶V account seems predictably self-serving ± working to absolve him of any criticism for 
getting involved in policy-making ± it also downplays his participation in policy discussions. 
His description of what constituted DQµLGHDOVS\¶LQDFROOHFWLRQRIVS\VWRULHVWKDWKHHGLWHG
in 1968, furthermore, reinforced the HPSKDVLVRQ'XOOHV¶VUROHas daring super-agent focused 
predominantly on operational duties µ*UHDWQHVV DV D KXPDQ EHLQJ DQG JUHDWQHVV LQ WKH
DFFRPSOLVKPHQW RI KLV PLVVLRQ¶ 'XOOHV ZURWH ZHUH WKH TXDOLWLHV QHHGHG WR PDNH a great 
spy.10  
 
Dulles scholarsWKHUHIRUHKDYHWHQGHGWRIRFXVRQWKLVDVSHFWRI'XOOHV¶VSHUVRQDOLW\
3HWHU *URVH IRU H[DPSOH KDV DUJXHG WKDW µ$OOHQ IRU KLV SDUW ZDV QXUWXUHG LQ PDWWHUV RI
foreign policy, but he always claimed that his duty was only that of a professional 
LQWHOOLJHQFH RIILFHU OHDYLQJ WKH SROLF\PDNLQJ WR RWKHUV¶ 5LFKDUG ,PPHUPDQ KDV PDGH D
VLPLODUDUJXPHQWVXJJHVWLQJWKDW'XOOHVµZRXOGUDWKHURYHUWKURZDJRYHUQPHQWWKDQHYDOXDWH
LW¶,QDn overly positive biography of Dulles, James Srodes makes the nonetheless important 
SRLQWWKDWKHZDVµDFRPSOH[SHUVRQDOLW\¶± VKXQQLQJµWKHIURQWUDQNRIKLVWRU\¶EXWKXQJHULQJ
µIRUSRZHUDQGWKHDFFRPSDQ\LQJFHOHEULW\¶± LPEXHGZLWKDµVHQVHRIPRUDOFHUWDLQW\¶DQGD
µUHSXWDWLRQIRULQFLVLYHKRQHVW\¶+XJK:LOIRUG¶VDSSUDLVDOLVcloser to the mark, describing 
'XOOHV DV EHLQJ LGHDOO\ VXLWHG WR WKH UROH RI D VS\ GXH WR KLV µMRYLDO SUDJPDWLVP DQG LQQHU
FROGQHVV¶ By contrast, Tim Weiner has provided one of the most caricatured appraisals of 
Dullesµthrough his devotion to covert action, his disdain for the details of analysis, and his 
dangerous practice of deceiving the  president of the United States, Allen Dulles did untold 
GDPDJH WR WKH DJHQF\ KH KDG KHOSHG WR FUHDWH¶11 To be sure, these were key facets of his 
personality; Dulles enjoyed the cut-and-thrust of intelligence operations, and did have a 
playful aspect to his character. In 1957, for instance, he and former Treasury Secretary 
George Humphrey initiated a wager as to whether Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, 
would be out of office within six months.12 The majority of historical analysis, then, has 
IRFXVHG RQ 'XOOHV¶V UROH LQ FRYHUW RSHUDWLRQV DQG DV KHDG RI WKH &,$ UDWKHU WKDQ SROLF\-
making discussions. Selected quotes and episodes are included, but there are few concerted 
HIIRUWV WR DQDO\VH 'XOOHV¶V position in internal policy matters. Another reason for this, it 
should be noted, is that available archival materials on Dulles remain far from complete. 
Many sources relating to his activities remain unopened, while even those that are available 
are far from voluminous. To cite an oft-quoted example of the this, historians know that the 
Dulles brothers met up most weekends to discuss policy issues but have very little idea of 
what they said to each other. Indeed, the entire relationship between the Dulles brothers ± and 
the way this played out in policy-making circles ± is often a matter of little more than 
speculation.13 In the midst of an incomplete historical record, new analyses of Dulles and the 
Agency remain subject to qualifications. 
 
NeverthelessLWLVHDV\WRVHHZKHUHWKLVHPSKDVLVRQ'XOOHV¶VUROHLQRSHUDWLRQVKDV
FRPH IURP 7KH &,$¶V OHJDF\ XQGHU KLV OHDGHUVKLS ZDV PRVW REYLRXVO\ IHOW LQ WKH ILHOG RI
operations ± with a series of ostensibly successful interventions undertaken which often had 
tragic outcomes for the nations involved.14 Moreover, his background in intelligence before 
joining the fledgling CIA was that of an operative keenly embracing operational 
responsibility and enjoying the cut-and-thrust of covert action. In both world wars Dulles was 
an intelligence operative in Switzerland. Following World War Two, he was involved in the 
formative stages of the CIA ± culminating, in the early-1950s, with a senior operational role 
and, in 1953, with a move to become the Director of Central Intelligence. By 1953, moreover, 
the CIA had emerged as a powerful and stable institution within the Washington bureaucracy. 
Dulles was head of an Agency that was both important and well funded; its reach was 
extensive and it was subject to little congressional oversight.15  
 
For Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, of course, the desirability of having the 
VHFUHWDU\RIVWDWH¶VEURWKHULQFKDUJHRIWKH&,$FDPHIURPWKHFHUWDLQW\WKDWKHZRXOGYHU\
much serve as their man in the Agency, ensuring that it was used as an effective operational 
arm for an administration concerned as much with financial prudence as waging the Cold 
War.16 Yet he also began to demonstrate a candour and pragmatism in analysis and 
discussion that is somewhat removed from the archetypal view of his role. This was not 
always matched by his tone in private, which was often more bellicose and less guarded then 
it was in official settings, but its recurrent nature under Eisenhower had an undoubted impact 
RQ WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V GHFLVLRQV 3HUKDSV PRVW VLJQLILFDQWO\ 'XOOHV demonstrated a 
willingness in his understanding of the global situation to move beyond traditional constructs 
UHJDUGLQJ D FRPPXQLVW µPRQROLWK¶17 In a speech at the National War College in 1954, for 
instance, Dulles provided an analysis of Soviet policy that was somewhat removed from the 
GRJPDWLF PRQROLWK RI SRSXODU FRQFHSWLRQ µ:KHQ ZH FRPH WR GHDO ZLWK WKH TXHVWLRQ RI
Soviet policy, or the policy, for that matter, of aQ\FRXQWU\LQWKHZRUOG¶KHVWDWHGµ,WKLQN
we make a great mistake if we assume there is any clear-FXW EOXHSULQW«, EHOLHYH WKDW WKH
Soviet leaders improvise in many phases of their policy as events unroll, just as we have to 
do, and have their uncalculaWHGUHYHUVHVMXVWDVZHGR¶18  
 
Dulles also demonstrated a capacity to starkly criticize US policy if he believed that 
the Soviets had stolen a march due to American mistakes. This became especially evident in 
the mid-1950s ± when Moscow moved purposefully WRFRXUW WKH³KHDUWVDQGPLQGV´RI WKH
Third World through diplomatic overtures and offers of economic assistance, and when the 
US was compelled to face up to a growing Soviet challenge in the developing world.19 In 
many areas of the developing world ± but particularly in Southeast Asia and the Middle East 
± the Soviet Union was able to make swift progress in its attempts to curry favour with so-
called neutral nations by offering deals that the US would never have agreed to. For Dulles, 
0RVFRZ¶VHIIRUWVGHPonstrated a realistic appraisal of the nature of economic development in 
those regions. In an undated UHSRUWIURP'XOOHVQRWHGµWhey [the Soviets] have created 
WKHLPSUHVVLRQWKDWWKH\GRQRWORRNXSRQ¶WKHSHRSOHVRI6RXWKDQG6RXWKHDVW$VLDDQGWKe 
0LGGOH (DVW µDV ³EDFNZDUG´ RU ³XQGHUGHYHORSHG´ SKUDVHV ZH KDYH WRR RIWHQ XVHG¶
)XUWKHUPRUH KH ZHQW RQ µWKH 6RYLHWV KDYH EHHQ PRVW IOH[LEOH«WKH\ KDYH UHTXLUHG QR
REYLRXVTXLGSURTXRLQWKHLUQHJRWLDWLRQV¶20  
 
His ruminations on this point, moreover, led him to some important conclusions about 
the inherent difficulties that the US faced in adhering to its own model of development in the 
face of Soviet incursions, particularly in an area like Asia which was suffering from chronic 
under-GHYHORSPHQW µ5HJUHWWDEOH DV LW PLJKW EH¶ KH WROG WKH 16& PHHWLQJ RI 18 January, 
µPRVWRIWKHIUHHFRXQWULHVRI$VLDKDYHVXFKSULPLWLYHVRFLHWLHVDQGJRYHUQPHQWVWKDW
there is no private enterprise which can be developed and supported by US assistance 
SURJUDPV¶21 He was also acutely aware of emerging threats to American interests. In 
(LVHQKRZHU¶VVHFRQGWHUP± when US appraisals and conceptions of the non-aligned nations 
were gradually becoming more sophisticated ± Dulles provided a succinct appraisal of how 
events among the Third World could affect US objectives. In these circumstances, Dulles 
explained, overt Soviet action was easier to deal with and less damaging than a show of 
GLVVHQWIURPDQDWLRQWKDWWKH86ZDVWU\LQJWRFRXUWµ6RYLHWDJJUHVVLRQWKURXJKUHFRXrse to 
OLPLWHGZDUV¶'XOOHVVWDWHGµSUHVHQWHGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVZLWKPXFKOHVVRIDSUREOHPWKDQ
was presented by developments such as those in Indonesia, which the Soviets could 
HIIHFWLYHO\H[SORLWWRZHDNHQWKH)UHH:RUOG¶22 
 
There is also a sense, DulOHV¶V GLVDYRZDOV UHJDUGLQJ WKH SURSHU UROH RI WKH '&,
notwithstanding, that Eisenhower increasingly saw Dulles as much more than just a provider 
of intelligence. In December 1953, in an end of year letter to the DCI, Eisenhower enthused 
DERXW'XOOHV¶VUROH LQµDVVXULQJWKDWRXUFRPPRQSXUSRVHRIVXVWDLQLQJPD[LPXPLQGLYLGXDO
freedom and responsibility is not only woven better into the laws of the land, but there will be 
no deviation from the goal of helping every American to achieve constantly rising standards 
RIKHDOWKHGXFDWLRQDQGSURVSHULW\¶23 In 1957, as the Killian Committee got ready to make 
its recommendations on US technology in the wake of the successful Soviet launch of 
6SXWQLN 'XOOHV ZURWH WR (LVHQKRZHU DQG LQIRUPHG KLP WKDW KH ZDV µORRNLQJ IRrward to 
GLVFXVVLQJ WKHLU FRQFOXVLRQV ZLWK \RX¶24 By 1960, meanwhile, Eisenhower was thanking 
'XOOHV IRU KLV µFRXQVHO DVVLVWDQFH DQG >KLV@ YHU\ SUHVHQFH¶.25 Collectively, the above 
examples suggest that the DCI was much more within the administration than just a supplier 
of intelligence. 
 
$V WKLV WRXU G¶KRUL]RQ RI VRPH RI $OOHQ 'XOOHV¶V FRntributions to Eisenhower 
administration policy discussions suggests, he often took positions that were rational and 
perceptive, somewhat bucking the perception of him as a disinterested participant in policy 
discussions. To be sure, he was not opposed to rhetorical cheerleading or attempts to gee up 
foreign allies. He speculatively told British officials in Geneva in 1956 thatµDFFRUGLQJWRKLV
intelligence the Communists were in some difficulty in North Vietnam and were not doing 
toR ZHOO HYHQ LQ /DRV¶26 But in internal discussions he rarely adopted such assertive 
positions. In keeping with his understanding of the National Security Act, the available 
evidence suggests that he rarely made overt policy demands. Nonetheless, his opinion carried 
significant weight. It is worth noting here that Allen Dulles was not always a contrarian 
voice: oftentimes, he was supporting positions already taken and further elucidating existing 
propositions. On other occasions ± when CIA interests were not at stake or he did not feel the 
need to interpose his own view ± Dulles did not involve himself. The constant aspect to this, 
however, ZDV'XOOHV¶s pragmatic tone when he did speak up ± a tone that was particularly 
HYLGHQW LQ KLV LQYROYHPHQW RQ GLVFXVVLRQV RYHU WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V SROLF\ WRZDUG /DWLQ
America. 
 
 
$//(1'8//(6$1'/$7,1$0(5,&$'85,1*(,6(1+2:(5¶6),5677(50 
 
 'XOOHV¶VILUVWLQYROYHPHQWRQ/DWLQ$PHULFDQaffairs in 1953 typified the way that he 
would participate in GLVFXVVLRQVRIWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶Vregional policy. At the NSC Meeting 
on 18 February, Dulles offered a summary of the situation in the region that was multi-
faceted, sobering and complex. Some problems, he noted, were undoubtedly caused by 
communist groups ± although not Moscow itself ± but other difficulties were motivated by 
GLIIHUHQW IDFWRUV µ7KH IRXU PDMRU WUHQGV LQ 6RXWK DQG &HQWUDO $PHULFD ZHUH WUHQGV LQ WKH
direction of economic nationalism, regionalism, neutralism, and increasing Communist 
influence.¶ Each of these, he continued, posed an equal threat to US interests.27 This summary 
was at odds with that which would characterize wider statements of other US officials; in 
testimonies to Congress, John Foster Dulles starkly invoked the communist menace in the 
region.28 While this was, predictably, motivated by the desire to secure a consensus for US 
SROLFLHVLQWKHUHJLRQ$OOHQ'XOOHV¶VEUHDNGRZQRIWKHGLIIHULQJHOHPHQWVLQWKHUHJLRQZDV
the most sophisticated apSUDLVDO SXW IRUZDUG E\ RQH RI (LVHQKRZHU¶V OHDGLQJ DGYLVRUV
Toward the end of the same meeting, DCI Dulles outlined his resistance to becoming 
involved in substantive policy discussions. After (LVHQKRZHUDVNHGKLPµwhat could be done 
to improve the situatLRQ LQ 6RXWK $PHULFD¶ 'XOOHV UHSOLHG µwhile it was not within his 
province to deal with policy, it was at least clear to him that this Government needed to 
review the situation in Latin America.¶29 
 
 In the discussions which followed and led up to the creDWLRQRI WKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V
first regional policy document, neither Dulles nor the CIA played much of a role beyond the 
imparting of intelligence data.30 At the March 18 NSC meeting to finalise the document Allen 
'XOOHV¶V YRLFH ZDV QRW KHDUG31 And while his appraisal of the different challenges 
confronting the administration in the region was evident LQ WKHGRFXPHQW¶V ILQDO GUDIW WKLV
was clearly a policy driven by Eisenhower, Foster Dulles, and the appropriate officials from 
the departments of State, Defense and Treasury.32 Subsequent progress reports on the 
development of the inter-American relationship ± while taking into account information 
µIXUQLVKHG¶ E\ WKH $JHQF\ ± included little reference to CIA activities or a role in policy 
implementation. Even iQ WKH ILHOGV RI µLQIRUPDWLRQ¶ DQG µSXEOLF UHODWLRQV¶ WKHUH ZDV OLWWOH
mention of a CIA role, with much of the efforts being undertaken by organisations like the 
USIA or through high-SURILOHJHVWXUHVVXFKDVWKHSUHVLGHQW¶VVSHHFKEHIRUHWKH2UJDQL]DWLRQ
of American States (OAS).33  
 
Dulles and the CIA became much more prominent in those cases considered to be of 
SUHVVLQJ VWUDWHJLF LPSRUWDQFH 'XULQJ (LVHQKRZHU¶V ILUVW WHUP WKH PRVW KLJK-profile ± and 
infamous ± of these was the developing situation in Guatemala, where the elected 
government of Jacobo Arbenz was causing increasing concern to the US due to its alternative 
socio-economic agenda and rumoured links to regional and international communist groups.34 
Discussions about a possible intervention had been ongoing since 1950, when fears about 
potential links between the Guatemalan government and local and international communists 
began to gather pace. The presence of high-profile Guatemalan communists in the 
governments of Jose Arévalo and Jacobo Arbenz, coupled with economic and agricultural 
policies that eventually led to the appropriation of land from the United Fruit Company in 
1953, provided the catalyst for serious consideration of a covert operation to help Guatemalan 
dissidents overthrow the incumbent regime. Though these discussions ultimately came to 
naught ± with poor security at the CIA and State Department indecision undermining early 
plans ± the situation remained in need of resolution when Eisenhower entered the White 
House.35  
 
 At the aforementioned NSC meeting of 18 February, 1953, Dulles had highlighted the 
Guatemalan situation as the most pressing threat to AmHULFDQLQWHUHVWVLQWKHUHJLRQDVµthe 
development of pro-Communist influence was such as to mark an approaching crisis. It was 
quite SRVVLEOH¶ KH FRQWLQXHG µWKDW *XDWHPDOD¶V QHLJKERXUV PLJKW WDNH PLOLWDU\ DFWLRQ WR
SURWHFW WKHPVHOYHV IURP &RPPXQLVW LQIHFWLRQ¶36 'XOOHV¶V XVH RI WKH WHUP µFRPPXQLVW
LQIHFWLRQ¶ ZDV GHOLEHUDWH DQG VXJJHVWLYH OLNH PDQ\ RI KLV FRQWHPSRUDULHV LQ WKH
administration, he was well aware that its use heightened tensions and increased the 
likelihood of action being taken. Such sentiments, moreover, fit his private assessment 
GHWDLOHGLQD&,$PHPRUDQGXPIRUWKHUHFRUGZKHUHKHZURWHµ7KH\>WKH*XDWHPDODQV@KDYH
flaunted us and consistently got away with it. It is time they were brought to realize that this 
FRXOGQRWFRQWLQXH¶In this memo he went on to raise the possibility of the president warning 
of Soviet penetration of Guatemala and of the administration sponsoring two congressmen to 
make speeches along similar lines ± suggestions which he would likely have steered clear of 
in policy discussions among the NSC.37 Nevertheless, Dulles was not the only person 
expressing such views about the challenge that Guatemala posed to US interests, and in a 
1DWLRQDO ,QWHOOLJHQFH (VWLPDWH SURGXFHG VKRUWO\ DIWHU 'XOOHV¶V PHPRUDQGXP WKH '&,¶V
LQIOXHQFHFDQEHFOHDUO\VHHQµ*XDWHPDOD¶WKHUHSRUWDUJXHGµKDVIUHTXHQWO\WDNHQRFFDVLRQ
to demonstrate its independence of US leadership and in general has been less cooperative 
WKDQFRXOGEHGHVLUHG¶38 As planning continued and the US ramped up its rhetoric regarding 
the challenge facing it in Guatemala the prospects of intervention became ever more likely.39 
 
 In terms of operational planning and implementation, the Agency quickly became the 
central player. But the actual impetus for intervention came from the president. As Nick 
&XOODWKHU KDV DUJXHG $JHQF\ RIILFLDOV µRIWHQ KDG OLWWOH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI RU LQWHUHVW LQ WKH
motives of those in the Department of State, the Pentagon, and the White House who made 
WKH ILQDO GHFLVLRQ¶40 It was, then, a combination of administration desire, broader 
international concerns and sophisticated public relations efforts on the behalf of vested 
interests like United Fruit that drove the decision to intervene in Guatemala.41  By February, 
1953, the New York Times was running stories describing the efforts of Guatemalan 
communiVWV WR VHL]H µRXWULJKW FRQWURO¶ and while, at this stage, some degree of separation 
between the communists and Arbenz was being maintained these distinctions quickly 
evaporated.42  
 
Once the spectre of communism was invoked, it became a convenient frame for 
analysts and officials to use in describing the threat posed by Arbenz, and went well beyond 
the idea of a Kremlin-controlled movement.43 Agency officials quickly latched onto this 
linguistic turn and began to frame their analysis accordingly.44 In briefing John Puerifoy 
before he took up his post as US Ambassador to Guatemala, CIA officials informed him that 
WKHVLWXDWLRQ WKHUHZDV µDGYHUVH¶ WR86 LQWHUHVWV DQG WKDW$UEHQ]¶V OLQNZLWK µFRPPXQLVP¶
was the major problem.45 Similarly, by September the CIA was describing Guatemala as the 
µOHDGLQJEDVHRIRSHUDWLRQVIRU0RVFRZLQIOXHQFHs communLVPLQ&HQWUDO$PHULFD¶46  
 
Yet at this point it is necessary to distinguish between Allen Dulles ± particularly in 
internal policy discussions ± and the Agency. 'XOOHV¶V advice in internal discussions was 
often far removed from the frameworks being used in internal CIA correspondence and 
reports. Even as covert plans developed in late-1953 and 1954, and the Eisenhower 
administration worked to create an international climate supportive of intervention, Dulles 
adopted a position of cautious pragmatism in his dealings with the White House.47 US efforts 
to prove links between Guatemala and the Soviet bloc by uncovering arms shipments from 
behind the Iron Curtain, for example, were seen as overly aggressive by DCI Dulles. This 
was in spite of the fact that an earlier shipment ± aboard the Swedish ship, the Alfhem ± had 
RULJLQDWHGEHKLQGWKH,URQ&XUWDLQDQGWKH&,$KDGVRXJKWWRXVHWKLVWRµSURYH*XDWHPDODQ
HIIRUWV WR LPSRUW FODQGHVWLQHO\ DUPV IURP EHKLQG ,URQ &XUWDLQ¶48 Provable links between 
Guatemala and the Soviet bloc were fair enough, Dulles argued to the NSC in May 1954, but 
IXUWKHUVKLSPHQWVPLJKWµZHOOFRPHIURPRWKHUFRXQWULHVWKDQWKRVHEHKLQGWKH,URQ&XUWDLQ¶
$Q\VXEVHTXHQWSXEOLFLW\KHZHQWRQVKRXOGWKHUHIRUHµWDNHDFFRXQWRIWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKe 
XVHWRZKLFKWKHDUPVZHUHSXWUDWKHUWKDQWKHSODFHRIRULJLQRIWKHVKLSPHQW¶49  
 
)XUWKHUHYLGHQFHRI'XOOHV¶VUHDOLVWVWUHDNGXULQJSROLF\GLVFXVVLRQVFDPHLQWKHPLGVW
of a debate on whether the Department of Justice should be allowed to bring an anti-trust 
ruling against the United Fruit Company in June 1954. A year earlier, it had been agreed that 
the action should be postponed for a year while the Attorney General sought to work with the 
company so that corrective steps could be taken to render the pending action obsolete, as it 
VHHPHGFOHDU WKDW WRSURVHFXWH WKHFDVHDW WKLV WLPHFRXOGKDYHµDGYHUVHHIIHFWVRQQDWLRQDO
VHFXULW\ LQWHUHVWV LQ /DWLQ $PHULFD¶50 By 1954 the situation had changed and, for some 
officials, implementing the suit now seemed advisable. The most prominent of these ± in a 
stance further dispelling allegations that US involvement was motivated due to high-level 
links between the administration and United Fruit ± was Foster Dulles, who told the NSC 
that, given the tensions surrounGLQJSHUFHLYHG86VXSSRUWIRUWKHFRPSDQ\LQWKHUHJLRQµLW
PLJKWEHSRVLWLYHO\DGYDQWDJHRXVWR86SROLF\LQ/DWLQ$PHULFDLIWKHVXLWZHUHLQVWLWXWHG¶
His brother, however, disagreed: if Washington held fire, Allen Dulles argued, their patience 
might weOOEHUHZDUGHGµ:KLOHKHIHDUHGWKDWLIWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI-XVWLFHDQQRXQFHGWKHVXLW
in the next few days the results might tend to support the position which President Arbenz 
KDGWDNHQ«WKLVZRXOGSUREDEO\QRWEHVRDPRQWKIURPQRZE\ZKLFKWLPHWKHVLWuation in 
*XDWHPDODZRXOGKDYHEHHQFODULILHG¶51  
 
7KH PRVW IDPRXV H[DPSOH RI 'XOOHV¶V SUDJPDWLVP LQ GLVFXVVLRQV RYHU *XDWHPDOD
however, comes from the time of the operation itself. From Washington, it quickly became 
apparent to the administration that if the operation was to succeed, some form of mild air 
support would be necessary. At a meeting at the White House, Eisenhower asked Dulles and 
Assistant Secretary of State, Henry Holland, whether he should authorize US air support to 
bolster the invasion. Holland said not ± EHOLHYLQJWKH86VKRXOGµNHHS>LWV@KDQGVRII¶GXHWR
the impact this would have on Latin American opinions of the US. Dulles, on the other hand, 
pressed the president to say yes ± telling Eisenhower that without further support the 
operation was doomed to failure, while a supply of aircraft would increase the chance of 
VXFFHVV WRµSHUFHQW¶(LVHQKRZHU, in stark contrast to the events surrounding the Bay of 
Pigs seven years later, sided with Dulles, citing his realistic appraisal as the tipping point. 
µ$OOHQWKDWILJXUHRISHUFHQWZDVSHUVXDVLYH¶(LVHQKRZHUWROGKLPDVKHOHIWKLVRIILFH
µ,WVKRZHGPHWKDW\RXKDGWKRXJKWWKLVPDWWHUWKURXJKUHDOLVWLFDOO\¶52 Richard Bissell later 
ZURWH WKDW 'XOOHV¶V DFWLRQV DURXQG WKH WLPH RI WKH invasion demonstrated his belief that 
µ(LVHQKRZHU ZRXOG EH EHVW VHUYHG LI SURYLGHG ZLWK WKH XQYDUQLVKHG WUXWK DERXW WKH
RSHUDWLRQ¶VSRWHQWLDO IRU IDLOXUH¶53 $QG WKRXJK WKH UHVXOWVEHDU%LVVHOO¶V DVVHUWLRQVRXW WKH
FRQVLVWHQW QDWXUH RI 'XOOHV¶V SRVLWLRQ suggests that he was neither as disinterested nor as 
reluctant to take part in policy discussions as has been argued.  
 
Through 1953 and 1954, then, Allen Dulles displayed a consistent streak of 
pragmatism in his positions with respect to US policy toward Latin America. Moreover, this 
remained true even when other areas of the CIA adopted simplistic models of hysteric anti-
communism and in spite of a broader administration atmosphere of strident opposition toward 
suspected communists'XOOHV¶VFDQGRur and steadfast refusal to overstate a case portrays a 
very different side to his policymaking character than that typically in evidence in studies that 
focus on his role in covert operations. In the midst of the Guatemalan intervention, the New 
York Times identifLHG $OOHQ 'XOOHV DV WKH NH\ ILJXUH LQ WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V HIIRUWV WR
µHUDGLFDWH¶ WKH FRPPXQLVW WKUHDW IURP /DWLQ $PHULFD µ,I VRPHERG\ ZDQWV WR VWDUW D
UHYROXWLRQDJDLQVWWKH&RPPXQLVWVLQVD\*XDWHPDOD¶WKHSDSHUQRWHGµLWLVQRJRRGWDONLQJ
to Foster Dulles. But Allen Dulles, head of the Central Intelligence Agency, is a more active 
PDQ¶54 In terms of operations, the Times KDGDSRLQW'XOOHV¶V&,$DIWHUDOOZDVVSHFLILFDOO\
designed to effectively implement covert operations. When it came to policy discussions, 
however, this was not the case. More importantly, this raises serious questions about the 
UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ 'XOOHV¶V UROH LQ SROLF\ GLVFXVVLRQV DQG KLV RYHUVLJKW RI WKH $JHQF\¶V
RSHUDWLRQV7KHWRQHRIWKH&,$¶V&ROG:DURSHUDWLRQV± particularly those in Latin America 
± GRQRWVHHPWRPDWFKWKHQDWXUHRI'XOOHV¶VFRQWULEXWLRQVWRSROLF\GLVFXVVLRQV5DWLRQDOLW\
DQGGHWDFKPHQWLQWKHDQDO\WLFDOVSKHUHGLGQRWLQ$OOHQ'XOOHV¶VZRUOGH[WHQG to the realms 
of covert action. For the historian, this suggests a more tragic outcome than that normally 
associated with Dulles: if it was not disinterest that characterized his role in policy 
discussions but was in fact realism and candour, why were these traits not transposed onto the 
&,$¶VRSHUDWLRQal plans?  
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'XULQJ (LVHQKRZHU¶V VHFRQG WHUP WKH &,$¶V lustre began to dim slightly as a series of 
XQVXFFHVVIXO RSHUDWLRQV DQG LQWHOOLJHQFH IDLOXUHV EURXJKW WKH $JHQF\¶V UROH XQGHU WKH
microscope. The Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957, troubled CIA incursions into Indonesia, 
Laos and Syria, coupled with earlier problems surrounding the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian 
XSULVLQJDWWKHHQGRI(LVHQKRZHU¶VILUVWWHUP all conspired to sully the Agency¶VUHSXWDWLRQ55 
Nevertheless, Allen Dulles remained a key figure within the administration ± both with 
respect to policy implementation, such as the U-2 spy-plane flights and operations in Laos 
and Indonesia, and with regard to intelligence summaries and Agency views on prevailing 
situations. 
 
 Although Dulles and the CIA were called upon sporadically after January 1956, it was 
in the wake of the Nixon trip to Caracas, Venezuela in 1958 that Dulles began to play a more 
prominent role. Like the Guatemalan case, Dulles became more prominent when a crisis was 
looming. 2QHRIWKHPRVWVLJQLILFDQWIHDWXUHVRI'XOOHV¶VDFWLRQVDWWKLVWLPHZDVKLVUROHLQ
assessing the causes and the impact of the protests Nixon encountered in 1958. For the first 
time, US officials began to consistently accept that the Latin Americans might have 
legitimate grievances. Dulles, moreover, was a central figure in developing this view ± one 
that fused newly emerging views regarding nationalism with more long-standing constructs 
relating to international communism. 
  
 When Nixon arrived back in Washington following his traumatic experiences in 
Venezuela ± where his motorcade had been surrounded, stoned and spat upon ± he spoke 
candidly to the press about what was causing anti-American discontent in the region.56 The 
Latin Americans, Nixon stated LQDQDGGUHVVDWWKHDLUSRUWDUHµconcerned, as they should be, 
DERXWSRYHUW\DQGPLVHU\DQGGLVHDVHZKLFKH[LVWVLQVRPDQ\SODFHV«WKH\DUHGHWHUPLQHGWR
GRVRPHWKLQJDERXWLW«WKH\DUHPRYLQJWRZDrd economic progress. And the United States is, 
and should be, proud to work with them as partners.¶57 A week later, though, Nixon had 
reverted to reflexive anti-communism µCommunist inspiration was evident from the 
similarity of placards, slogans and techniques,¶1L[RQWROG(LVHQKRZHU¶VFDELQHWµThe Soviet 
Union¶ John Foster Dulles quickly concurred, µhad cleverly infiltrated mass political 
movements in Latin America.¶$OOHQ'XOOHVKRZHYHUWRRNKLVEURWKHUDQGWKHYLFHSUHVLGHQW
WRWDVNµ+LVDJHQF\¶he told them, µcould find no evidence that Moscow had orchestrated the 
Nixon incidents.¶58 He later provided statistical evidence, informing the NSC that of ninety 
nine people arrested after the protests, only twelve had links to communist groups.59 In a 
further report to his brother, he expressed these sentiments more clearly. µ$OWKRXJK
XQGRXEWHGO\&RPPXQLVWLQVWLJDWHG¶KHZURWHµWKHVHGHPRQVWUDWLRQVGLGJLYHH[SUHVVLRQWRD
SRSXODUVHQVHRIJULHYDQFHVDJDLQVWFHUWDLQSKDVHVRI86SROLF\¶60 
 
'XOOHV¶VFKDOOenge to the anti-communist assertions of Nixon and Foster Dulles came 
at a crucial moment. Mid-level officials in the Eisenhower administration were beginning to 
consistently agree that Latin American complaints against the US might be more than a result 
of communist incitement. And though this did not lead to any significant attempt to alter the 
policies that were of most concern to Latin Americans, it was a key conceptual shift in an 
ongoing re-evaluation of the way that the US approached the region. Indeed, it provided the 
impetus that officials and advisors like Thomas Mann, Milton Eisenhower, Roy Rubottom 
and Douglas Dillon used to push the idea that the US should utilise intelligent ± and high 
profile ± economic loans to alleviate inter-American tensions. While this did not mark any 
UHQXQFLDWLRQ RI WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V SUHYLRXV economic approach, it did mark a change in 
inter-American affairs.61 Dulles added to this trend with his backing for a mission, and 
subsequent report, by Milton Eisenhower shortly DIWHU 1L[RQ¶V UHWXUQ :LWK IHDUV DERXW
further protests leading to suggestions that the trip be cancelled, Dulles ± this time in tandem 
with his brother ± provided the momentum to ensure that the trip took place despite the 
likelihood of anti-American protests. The report that emerged, moreover, was a key 
document in bringing about significant shifts in the way the administration viewed the 
region.62 
 
Further examinations of communist activities in the region took their lead from Dulles 
and downplayed fears of a rapidly emerging communist threat in the region.63 Although CIA 
reports suggested that both Moscow and Beijing were looking to expand their interests in the 
area, the disparate nature of Latin American socialist movements made their success far from 
certain. Thus, while the danger of these groups forming a pro-Soviet neutralist bloc certainly 
existed, the nature of Latin American socialism meant that these groups remained 
XQFRPPLWWHGµ,QVWXG\LQJVRFLDOLVPLQ/DWLQ$PHULFD¶D&,$DSSUDLVDOQRWHGµLW should be 
understood that it is not a uniform movement bound by a coherent ideology and a monolithic 
GLVFLSOLQHDVWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RPPXQLVW0RYHPHQW¶64 
 
Again, it is important to note that Allen Dulles remained firmly committed to the fight 
against communism; his interjections, as they had during the Guatemalan episode, came 
when other officials were overstating the case. Equally, there are signs in the post-1958 
period of Dulles beginning to become more vocal in his advocacy of CIA operations in the 
region. H.W. Brands has argued that this was a result of a shift in internal dynamics 
IROORZLQJ)RVWHU'XOOHV¶VGHDWK IURPFDQFHU LQ$SULO 1959.65 Though this argument carries 
obvious weight, it is also clear that this was beginning at a much earlier stage. Following the 
Nixon trip, in fact, DCI Dulles told the NSC: µZHPD\DWORQJODVWJHWWKHQHFHVVDU\VXSSRUW
of these [Latin American] governments against the Communist. We are all ready to go if we 
FDQJHWVXFKVXSSRUW¶66 Thus while Allen Dulles did become a more prominent voice in the 
administration, this was not just because of the loss of his brother; other factors, such as the 
QHHGWRLPSURYHWKH&,$¶VWUDFNUHFRUGDQGDJURZLQJIUXVWUDWLRQDWdevelopments in the Cold 
War, also drove this shift. Yet even then, Dulles remained pragmatic and even-handed in his 
assessments of emerging threats. When the administration became concerned about a possible 
communist threat in Mexico in early-1959, Dulles wrote Eisenhower and informed him that 
this was not as simple as the US opposing Soviet directed communism in Central America. 
µ7KH &RPPXQLVW WKUHDW LQ 0H[LFR¶ 'XOOHV ZURWH µstems from two main elements: The 
Soviet and satellite diplomatic missions and native Marxism, coupled with extreme 
QDWLRQDOLVP¶67  
 
 The final examples of 'XOOHV¶V DFWLRQV come with the case-study of Cuba, which, 
although problematic for the US throughout the period after 1956, became a major concern 
following Fidel &DVWUR¶VRYHUWKURZRI Fulgencio %DWLVWDRQ1HZ<HDU¶V'Dy 1959.68 Prior to 
this WKH &,$¶V SHUIRUPDQFH KDG EHHQ IDU IURP VSHFWDFXODU; best estimates as to what was 
happening and predictions about the immediate future had proven erratic. At a meeting at the 
State Department just a few hours before Castro took power ± a meeting which included two 
participants from the Agency ± much of the talk was focused upon determining the US view 
of Castro and previous American HIIRUWVWRIRVWHUDµWKLUGZD\¶ between Castro and Batista. It 
was only as the meeting was breaking up that it was suggesteGWKDWµBatista would leave the 
FRXQWU\ ZLWKLQ  KRXUV¶ ± a proposal, moreover, that came from the US Ambassador in 
Havana and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, rather than the CIA.69 
 
 2QFH &DVWUR¶V YLFWRU\ ZDV DVVXUHG $OOHQ 'XOOHV DJDLQ EHFDPH D more prominent 
voice in internal discussions as US efforts turned to analysing the new regime and trying to 
predict its future course. Throughout 1958 and 1959, Dulles maintained a strong line on Cuba 
± eschewing the temptation to paint Castro as a communist and insisting that, while key 
advisors like Che Guevara and Raul Castro might be communists, Castro was not. After the 
revolution, Dulles even testified sympathetically to Congress about emerging reports of the 
Castro regime executing its political opponents; it made VHQVH 'XOOHVPXVHG µto kill your 
enemies.¶70 Nevertheless, both Dulles and Agency analysts were concerned about the new 
regime in Cuba because of how Castro might destabilise the region. Dulles told the NSC that 
Cuba posed the most serious problem in the region, while Castro seemed to view himself as a 
µPDQRQKRUVHEDFNGHVWLQHGQRWRQO\WROLEHUDWH&XEDEXWWROLEHUDWHDOORWKHUGLFWDWRUVKLSVLQ
/DWLQ$PHULFD¶,QFRQFOXVLRQ'XOOHVDGYRFDWHGDFDXWLRQDU\LIILUPDQGSDWHUQDOLVWLFVWDQFH
toward Castro µ7KH QHZ &XEDQ RIILFLDOV¶ KH VWDWHG µKDG WR EH WUHDWHG PRUH RU OHVV OLNH
children. They had to be led rather than rebuffed. If they were rebuffed, like children, they 
ZHUHFDSDEOHRIGRLQJDOPRVWDQ\WKLQJ¶71 
 
 As 86 YLHZV RI &DVWUR¶V UHJLPH EHJDQ WR WDke the view that his agenda was much 
more radical than Washington would like ± inspired predominantly by high-profile 
nationalism, an abundant desire to be free of US influence and, just as troublingly, to 
aggressively oppose right-wing dictatorships in the region ± the Eisenhower administration 
began to adopt a position of strong opposition to the government in Havana. At this stage, 
neither leading administration officials nor the CIA believed Castro to be communist. In fact, 
Cuban communists visiting a Soviet conference in 1959 were warned, according to an 
$JHQF\ UHFRUG RI WKH FRQIHUHQFH WKDW &DVWUR µPD\ ³JR WR WKH ULJKW´ DQG EHWUD\ >WKH@
UHYROXWLRQ¶; subsequent Agency efforts to brief Castro about the conference, moreover, 
sparked a frank exchange with the Cuban leader about the threat that communism posed in 
Cuba.72 3DUWO\ DV D UHVXOW RI &DVWUR¶V Dpparent anti-communism, the Eisenhower 
administration and the CIA faced a difficult time in understanding Cuban anti-Americanism 
and the reasons that the government in Havana wanted to chart an independent course.73 This 
was expressed most stridently by Eisenhower himself, who told a reporter in October, 1959: 
µYou would think they would want good relationships. I don't know exactly what the 
difficulty is.¶74  
 
 Like in Guatemala, the decision to consider a move against Castro came 
predominantly from the White House, after which Agency and State Department planners 
moved to begin designing an operation. ,QWHUHVWLQJO\WKH&,$¶VILUVWSODQ± presented to the 
president by Dulles in early 1960 ± was rejected for not being ambitious enough and failing 
WR µmove against Castro in a positive and aggressive way which went beyond pure 
harassment¶75 Shortly after, covert planning ± as well as diplomatic and political efforts ± 
against Castro began to accelerate )RU WKH SXUSRVHV RI WKLV DUWLFOH $OOHQ 'XOOHV¶V PRVW
important role in this phase was in providing pragmatic analysis on the impact that Castro 
was having on the situation in the Caribbean and the affect that this was having on US 
interests in the region.76 In particular, the way that the developing animosity on behalf of 
Castro and Venezuelan leader Romulo Betancourt toward the reviled Dominican dictator 
Rafael Trujillo was threatening to boil over and destabilise the area.77 With Castro and 
Betancourt conspiring to oust Trujillo, US officials were faced with an obvious quandary as 
their position toward Cuba hardened: how could they mobilise Latin American ± and 
international ± support against Castro if they allowed Trujillo to remain in office?78 
 
 At first, neither Eisenhower nor his new secretary of state, Christian Herter, wanted to 
move against Trujillo. But the gradual realisation that opposing Trujillo was necessary if the 
US wanted to attain support against Castro began to tip the balance. By the spring of 1960, 
the Eisenhower administration had come to accept that Trujillo would have to leave office; 
PRUHRYHU WKH\ ZHUH VR HDJHU IRU %HWDQFRXUW¶V VXSSRUW DJDLQVW &DVWUR WKDW D VKLIW LQ WKH
dynamics in the Caribbean seemed desirable.79 Though this shift had already begun to take 
place, it was again given added weight and impetus by the support of Allen Dulles. The 
UHFRUGRIDQ16&PHHWLQJ LQ-XO\QRWHGµMr Dulles stated that he believes, and the 
intelligence community agrees, that the problem of Trujillo must be settled before the 
SUREOHPRI&DVWURFDQEHGHDOWZLWKHYHQWKRXJK&DVWURLVWKHJUHDWHUWKUHDW¶80 At the same 
time that his agency was planning a speculative and dangerous covert operation against 
Castro, therefore, Allen Dulles was still doing what he had done for the majority of 
(LVHQKRZHU¶VSUHVLGHQF\SURYLGHWKHSUHVLGHQWZLWKFDQGLGDQGSUDJPDWLFDGYLFHDERXWWKH
situation in Latin America. The great mystery, however, remains why he was unable to adopt 
WKHVDPHSULQFLSOHVWRWKH$JHQF\¶VRSHUDWLRQV 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In April 1961, just a few months after John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency, a brigade of 
US-trained Cuban exiles waded ashore at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba in an attempt to launch an 
insurgency that would ultimately overthrow Fidel Castro. The subsequent failure of the 
operation ± partly because the Cuban army knew the insurgents were coming, partly because 
of poor planning on the US side, and partly because Kennedy refused to sanction the full 
range of air support missions recommended by the CIA ± was a high-profile disaster for the 
new president (albeit one that carried more impact abroad than at home). During the ensuing 
fall-RXW ZKLFK VDZ .HQQHG\¶V DSSURYDO UDWLQJV DFWXDOO\ JR XS 'XOOHV¶s tenure at the CIA 
was brought to an ignominious end.81 This incident, coupled with the high-profile nature of 
US involvement in Guatemala, has imposed a narrative of covert operations, fervent anti-
communism and, ultimately, failure onto examinations of AOOHQ 'XOOHV¶V UROH LQ 86-Latin 
American relations. Dulles himself recognised this and, in the 1960s, drafted several attempts 
of a rebuttal to critics who blamed him and the CIA for the failed ousting of Castro.82 Piero 
Gleijeses has noted, however, that the failure over the Bay of Pigs was down to a lack of 
communication between the Agency and the Kennedy White House: when push came to 
VKRYH *OHLMHVHV ZULWHV HDFK PDGH DVVXPSWLRQV DERXW WKH RWKHU¶V EHKDYLRU WKDW XOWLPDWHO\
proved inaccurate.83 µWe felt that when the chips were down ± when the crisis arose in 
reality, any action required for success would be authorized rather than permit the enterprise 
WRIDLO¶'XOOHV later noted.84 
 
 'HVSLWH'XOOHV¶VGLVDYRZDOZHFDQVHHLQWKH%D\RI3LJVWKHWUDJHG\WKDWultimately 
lies at the centre of any study of his career as DCI. Had he been as rational in decisions over 
operations as he was in policy discussions on Latin America then his reputation might not be 
so tarnished.85 Clearly capable, and often more rational than many of his contemporaries, 
Allen Dulles was an inherently flawed character when it came to operational responsibility. 
This dichotomy, moreover, is made more sobering when one considers that it was not 
disinterest in the policy and analysis sphere that fed these problems, but a climate at the CIA 
that was almost entirely of his own making. Such conclusions make a report that Time 
published shortly after the Bay of Pigs striking in its discussion of whether intelligence 
agencies should conduct operations. µLast week¶WKHUHSRUWVWDWHGWKHµCIA was back in the 
news in a big way²and will probably stay there for some time, while a basic question that 
has been long and heatedly debated is argued out. Should any intelligence-gathering 
organization also have an operations responsibility?¶86 ,Q WKH FDVH RI $OOHQ 'XOOHV¶V
LQYROYHPHQWLQWKH(LVHQKRZHUDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VSROLF\WRZDUG/DWLQ$PHULFDLWVHHPVFOHDU
WKDWWKHDQVZHULVµQR¶ 
 
For his part, Dulles remained able to surprise with his realism and candour until he 
left his position with the Agency in November 1961. After a meeting with British officials in 
October of that year ± in which Dulles had conveyed American dissatisfaction with 
:DVKLQJWRQ¶V(XURSHDQSDUWQHUVDQGUDLVHGWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIDUHWUHDWWRµLVRODWLRQLVP¶± an 
RIILFLDO LQ WKH %ULWLVK 0LQLVWU\ RI 'HIHQFH VHQW D VXPPDU\ WR WKH 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU¶V RIILFH
QRWLQJµ,PXVWDGPLWWKDWWKHYHKHPHQFHDQGVRPHZKDWVZHHSLQJQDWXUHRI'XOOHV¶UHPDUNV
WRRNPHE\ VXUSULVH¶87 Beyond the ramifications thaW'XOOHV¶V UROHKDV IRU WKH UHODWLRQVKLS
between policy-making and Agency operations, however, WKLV UHDSSUDLVDO RI 'XOOHV¶V UROH
opens up obvious avenues to re-examine his participation in other areas of policy. With 
respect to Latin America, the consistently pragmatic nature of 'XOOHV¶V approach complicates 
previous understandings of his role in the administration, as well as posing new questions 
about the exact nature of the relationship between him and his brother when it came to 
policy-making discussions. Given the bureaucratic clout that Dulles had within the 
administration ± and given the extent to which Eisenhower took his suggestions onboard ± 
the recurrent nature of his pragmatic approach to Latin American policy discussions carried 
obvious weight. $QGWKRXJK'XOOHV¶VPRWLYDWLRQLQWDNLQJWKLVDSSURDFKLVQRWDOZD\VFOHDU
WKHLPSOLFDWLRQVWKDWWKLVKDVIRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VSROLF\-making structures 
are much more evident. Extending this appraisal to other areas of policy, for example, may 
well shed important new light on the role of the CIA in the 1950s. Similarly, examining Allen 
'XOOHV¶VUROHLQPRUHGHWDLOPD\VWDUWWRGLYHUWVFKRODUO\DWWHQWLRQDZD\IURPWKH(LVHQKRZHU-
Foster Dulles nexus that has dominated examinations of who determined US foreign policy in 
this era and bring other officials and agencies into the fold.88 Allen Dulles, as the present 
article has suggested, was not just a covert operations enthusiast; understanding how far this 
pragmatic facet to his character extended into other avenues offers intriguing possibilities for 
intelligence scholars. 
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